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Moffatt Hancock*

The Effect of a
Post-Occurrence Change of
Domicile upon a Choice of
Law Determining the Validity
of Other-Insurance Clauses
in an Accident Policy**

The state has a legitimate interest in applying a rule of decision
to... litigationonly if the facts to which the rule will be applied
have created effects within the statefor which the state's public
policy is directed. To assess the sufficiency of asserted contacts
between the forum and the litigation, the court must determine if
the contacts form a reasonable link between the litigation and a
state policy.
Mr. Justice Powell'
I. Facts of the Hague Case
Like many hundreds of his fellow countrymen, Ralph Hague (with
his wife Lavinia) made his home in one state, Wisconsin, and
commuted every day to his place of employment in another, Red
Wing, Minnesota. He had been so employed and had so commuted
for fifteen years when, on July 1, 1974, he was riding, as a
passenger, on his son's motorcycle in Wisconsin, near the
Minnesota border. They had stopped at a crossroad and signalled
their intention to make a left turn onto the crossroad. While waiting
for a car on the crossroad to go by, they were struck from behind by
a car owned and driven by Richard Borst, a noninsured driver.
Ralph Hague was so severely injured that he died en route to a
hospital in Daluth, Minnesota.
Prior to his fatal accident Ralph Hague had purchased a policy of
liability insurance covering injury or death that he might inflict upon
others while operating any one of three automobiles owned by him.
He paid a separate premium for each vehicle. A separate part of the
policy also insured him against bodily injury or death suffered by
him and caused by a noninsured negligent driver of another car
(hereinafter called an "NIN driver"). This insurance was not
*Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, Stanford University.
**The copyright for this title is owned by the author.
1. Dissenting opinion in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague (1981) 449 U.S. 302,
101 S. Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed. 2d 521.
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limited to situations where Hague was driving or riding in one of his
own three cars. Rather, it covered the loss resulting from his bodily
injury or death caused by a NIN driver even if Hague was driving or
riding in a car not owned by him or was using the highway as a
2
cylist or a pedestrian.

II. HistoricalBackgroundof NIN DriverInsurance
Insurance against the harm caused by NIN drivers was originally
conceived of and sold by insurance companies to palliate and defuse
the popular clamor for compulsory liability insurance of all motor
vehicles on the highways. 3 State legislators strongly favored the
new NIN driver protection. They hesitated to impose compulsory
liability insurance because it necessarily would result in higher
premiums for which they would be blamed. During the 1960s, state
after state passed statutes requiring all companies selling liability
insurance to residents of their state to offer NIN driver insurance to
all purchasers of liability insurance. Some state statutes purported to
compel the purchasers of liability policies to protect themselves by
buying the NIN driver insurance. This insurance was generally
required by the state statutes to promise a minimum of
compensation equal to the lowest amount of liability insurance that
an insured driver could buy under the law of the enacting state.
Had Ralph Hague owned only one car, he could have purchased
all of the coverage described above, plus the same protection for
members of his family and household, to the amount of $15,000 for
any one person's damages. Since only about ten per cent of the
drivers of American highways are noninsured, this broad protection
could have been bought for a relatively modest premium. However,
because he had three automobiles, Hague was required to pay three
times the premium that he would have paid had he had only one; this
would appear to be excessive. Since a large part of the risk assumed
by the insuring company, Allstate, was totally unrelated to the use
of any of Hague's automobiles (because it covered Hague while he
was a passenger or driver in a vehicle not owned by him), the fact
2. "The policy issued to Mr. Hague provided that Allstate would pay to the
insured or his legal representative damages 'sustained by the insured, caused by
accident, and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured
automobile...'" Opinion of Brennan J. in Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at p.
641, n. 18.
3. See Netherton, Highway Safety Under Differing Types of Liability Legislation,
15 OhioSt. L.J. 110(1954), nn. 2, 4, and5.
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that he owned three automobiles, instead of only one, did not
multiply threefold the risk that would have been incurred in the case
of his owning only one. True, the possibility that all three
automobiles might simultaneously be on the highways increased
that part of the risk related to the use of one or more of his three
automobiles. But the risk to him or to a member of his family in
circumstances not involving the use of any of his automobiles would
4
have remained the same whether he owned one or twenty.
The foregoing statements are based, of course, on the assumption
that Allstate was in no case to be liable for more than $15,000 to
defray the loss caused by the injury or death of one person. Such an
interpretation of the policy would make the amount of the premium
charged appear to be excessive and unfair. Thus, a more just and
rational interpretation of the policy would have required a judicial
decision that, since Hague had paid a triple premium, he was
entitled to a triple recovery, to wit, $45,000 to compensate his
5
widow for the wrongful killing of her husband by Richard Borst.
Since the purchase of insurance against NIN drivers was required
by Wisconsin law, unfair and oppressive overcharging of persons
owning more than one automobile deserved careful judicial
scrutiny. Two clauses contained in Hague's policy are pertinent
here, the first of which read as follows:
7. Other Insurance
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under
this coverage shall apply only as excess insurance over any other
similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to such
automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then
apply only in the amount by which the limit of the liability for
4. The foregoing discussion of various aspects of NIN driver insurance has been
based on the following works of reference: A. Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured
Motorist Coverage §$ 1-3 (1981 Supp.); Netherton, id; M. Franklin, Cases and
Materials on Tort Law and Alternatives, 733-35.
5. As the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mutual
Insurance Co. (1973), 296 Minn. 181: 207 N. W. 2d. 348 at 186 (permitting the
insured to recover $33,000 when she owned four separate policies on four separate
vehicles, each providing $10,000 in NIN driver protection): ". .the fact that the
legislature required an uninsured-motorist provision in all policies, added to the
fact that a premium has been collected on each of the policies involved, should
result in the policyholder's receiving what he paid for in each policy, up to the full
amount of his damages. . . [I]t seems more just that the insured who has paid a
premium should get all he paid for rather than that the insurer should escape
liability for that which it collected a premium."
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this coverage exceeds the 6 limit of liability for such other
insurance (emphasis added).
This clause clearly does not apply to the death of Ralph Hague.
Doubtless the policy contained a clause defining "bodily injury" so
as to include "death", and "automobile" so as to include
"motorcycle". Hague, therefore, was "occupying an automobile"
(as defined) "not owned by the name insured", that is, himself.
But, there was no "other similar insurance" available to him and
"applicable to" such automobile, as defined. His son, Ronald, had
no NIN driver insurance "applicable to" his motorcycle. "Other
similar insurance" must surely mean similar insurance under a
policy other than the policy in which the word "other" appears.
Neither did the second clause of section 7 apply to the death of
Ralph Hague. It read as follows:
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has
other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the
accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of
the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other
insurance and Allstate shall not be liable for a greater proportion
of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of
liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of
liability of this insurance and such other insurance (emphasis
7
added) .
Again, we note that "other similar insurance" cannot rationally
refer to insurance under the policy in which these words occur.
Moreover, the words "Allstate shall not be liable", et cetera, make
it absolutely clear that no part of Allstate's liability can be regarded
as other similar insurance.

III. Other Insurance Clauses in Hague's Policy Clearly Void for
Irrelevanceand Ambiguity
These clauses were obviously meant to deal with the situation in
which two or more persons held policies of NIN driver insurance,
each of which covered the accident in question. If, for example,
Ralph Hague's son had held a policy of NIN driver insurance
relating to his motorcycle, that policy would probably have covered
his father as a guest passenger on the motorcycle. That case would
have been covered by the first clause of section 7. Or, if Ronald, the
6. Weintraub, Who's Afraid of ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law?, 10

Hofstra L. Rev. 17, 18.

7. Ibid.
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son, had been hit by a NIN driver while crossing a road as a
pedestrian, he would have been covered by his own motorcycle
policy and by his father's policy as a family member. In this case,
the second clause of section 7 would have been applicable.
One would suppose that anyone familiar with the English
language would realize that the other-similar-insurance clauses in
Ralph Hague's policy could not possibly be read as referring to
insurance provided by the same policy in which they appeared,
which was also the only policy providing NIN driver insurance held
by the insured. Moreover, Professor Weintraub 8 has found several
cases in which, although the other-similar-insurance clauses were
identical with those in the Hague case, the insurer's counsel argued
that the clauses applied to a situation where the insured plaintiff had
purchased two or more separate policies issued by the same
insurance company respecting each of two or more cars. In each
case the court held that the clauses were too ambiguous to cover the
facts presented and allowed the insured to recover the total sum of
all policies issued to him by the same company.
Clauses such as these have been a prolific source of litigation
since NIN driver insurance first won the enthusiastic support of
insurance companies and legislators alike. To win popular support
also, the NIN driver coverage was, as we have seen, extended to the
named insured and the members of his family under all
circumstances in which a NIN driver could hurt or kill them. Guests
and paying passengers legally occupying one of the named insured's
vehicles were also covered. Thus, it frequently happened that the
victim of a NIN driver found himself covered by his own policy and
that of his host-driver or his father or both.
The insurance companies took it on themselves to ascribe to the
statutes encouraging and requiring this new insurance an unwritten
limitation, namely, that no victim of a NIN driver should receive
greater compensation than he would have received had he been
injured by an insured driver carrying the minimum legal limit of
liability insurance. Most victims of NIN drivers were able to
recover under only one policy. The legislature, it was argued, never
intended that the victim of a NIN driver should receive higher
compensation than the victim of a properly insured driver. If an
8. Weintraub, supra, note 4, at 21-23. The writer is particularly indebted to
Professor Weintraub for the assistance he has derived from Professor Weintraub's
analysis of this particular problem.
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injured person happened to be covered by two or more NIN driver
policies purchased by different persons, he should not obtain an
undeserved windfall.
IV. Other Insurance Clauses Held Contrary to Legislative Intent
and Policy of Overwhelming Majority of States
A large majority 9 of state courts told the insurance companies
emphatically that their state's legislation did not imply any such
unstated limitation; that is, persons covered by two or more NIN
driver policies purchased by several persons must be entitled to
collect (to the amount of his damages) the full sum provided by all
such policies without any reduction whatever. All other-similarinsurance clauses to the contrary were declared invalid, as being
contrary to the compensatory policies of the statute. A relatively
small minority of state courts agreed with the insurer's counsel,
holding that no legislative purpose of their statutes prevented an
insurance company from contracting in its policies for the reduction
or extinguishment of its liability to the victim of a NIN driver who
was covered by two or more policies purchased by different
persons. Such contracts must, however, be stated in the policy in
clear and unambiguous words.
V. Wisconsin Follows Minority Rule Holding Other Insurance
Clauses Valid if Clearand Certain
In the case of Nelson v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.,"0 which
was decided in 1974, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had
reaffirmed its position, as of 1968 (the date when the facts had
occurred) in agreement with the minority of state courts on the
specific problem stated in the preceding paragraph. On September
29, 1968, Lois Nelson sustained serious personal injuries in a
collision between a car driven by her and one owned and driven by
Richard Severson, a negligent noninsured driver who died in the
collision. Miss Nelson had, apparently, no NIN driver insurance of
her own. But she was driving, with permission, a car owned by her
employer, Denmark Farm Equipment Incorporated. Insurance
purchased by them from Employers Mutual Casualty Co. covered
9. As of 1981, only eight states will enforce the limitation on recovery advocated
by the insurers: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, New York,
South Carolina, and Utah. Widiss, supra, n. 4, at §2.59-2.61.
10. 63 Wis. 2d 558 (1974).
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her injury by a NIN driver to the amount of $10,000. She was also
covered, to the same amount, by similar insurance purchased by her
father from Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. Her damages
amounted to more than $20,000. Employers Mutual settled its
liability by paying $ 10,000.
Her father's policy with Mutual Service contained the following
clause relating to other similar insurance:
With respect to bodily injuries to an insured, while occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance
hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance over any other
similar insurance available to such occupant and this insurance
shall then apply only in the amount by which the applicable limit
of liability of this part exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of
liability of all such other insurance (emphasis added)."

This clause of the policy obviously covered the facts of the Nelson
case like a tent. Indeed, its application to those facts was not
questioned. The sole argument advanced against the clause was that
it contravened the compensatory policy of Wisconsin's 1967 statute
requiring insurers to offer NIN driver coverage to all purchasers of
liability insurance. Following two earlier decisions of 1971 and
1972,12 the Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the validity of the
other-similar-insurance clause.
Thus, it seems obvious that if Lavinia Hague had brought suit in a
Wisconsin court, claiming $45,000 under her husband's NIN driver
coverage, the Nelson case would have presented no obstacle to her
recovery under Wisconsin law, the law of her and her husband's
domicile at the time of his death. Unlike the facts of the Nelson
case, the facts of the Hague case did not fall within the scope of the
other-similar-insurance clause of Hague's policy. Moreover, none
of the earlier Wisconsin cases had involved a claim for NIN driver
insurance, based on a single policy purchased by the named insured,
to recover the amount of damages for his wrongful death sustained
by his beneficiaries. However, Lavinia Hague was not destined to
remain domiciled in Wisconsin or to file her famous suit in that
state.

11. Id, at 561.
12. Leatherman v. American Family Mit. Ins. Co. (1971) 52 Wis. 2d 644, and
Scherr v. Drobac (1972) 53 Wis. 2d 302.
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VI. Lavinia Hague Moves to Minnesota, Whose Domestic Law
Would Support Her Claim, and Sues Allstate
Shortly after her husband's death, Lavinia Hague moved from the
village of Hager City, Wisconsin (population 100) to Red Wing,
Minnesota (population 13,700), only a mile and a half from her
former abode. Less than two years after the fatal accident, on June
19, 1976, she married a Minnesota resident who owned a service
station in Bloomington, Minnesota, and went to live with him in
Savage, Minnesota. On May 28, the Registrar of Probate for
Goodhue County, Minnesota, appointed Lavinia Hague Personal
Representative of the estate of her deceased husband. In this
capacity, she filed suit on the same date in a Minnesota court against
Allstate. She petitioned the court for a declaration that she was
entitled to recover (on proof of sufficient damages) the full sum of
$45,000 under her husband's policy.
Lavinia Hague's counsel did not rely upon the arguments
previously advanced, namely, (1) that the other-insurance clauses
in Hague's policy could not be sensibly read as applicable to any of
the coverage provided by that very policy, (2) that the Wisconsin
case, Nelson v. Employers' Mutual Casualty Co., which enforced
an other-similar-insurance clause, had only involved other
insurance not purchased by the injured plaintiff. The different line
of argument actually chosen by Lavinia's counsel must have
appeared on first impression very attractive and convincing. In Van
Tassel v. Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Co., 13 decided in 1973,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota had held that all clauses which
reduced or eliminated the coverage of a NIN driver insurance policy
because other similar insurance was available to the insured were
void and unenforceable. The judges held, in a unanimous opinion,
that when the Minnesota legislature required insurers to offer to
every buyer of liability insurance NIN driver coverage up to the
level of at least $10,000 for each person so injured, the legislature
deprived the insurers of power under any circumstances to make
contracts reducing that coverage below the fixed sum. This case,
supported by the great majority 14 of other states, must have
appeared to provide Lavinia Hague's counsel with a powerful
argument, provided they could persuade the court that the policy of

13. See note 5, supra.
14. See note 9, supra.
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Minnesota law ought to cover her case because of its significant
factual contacts with that state, that is, her husband's fifteen years
of employment in Minnesota and her domicile there acquired after
his death.
VII. The Wisconsin Contacts:Did They Really Relate to Wisconsin
Policy?
Before examining these unusual contacts, let us briefly consider the
significance of the various Wisconsin contacts. Some judges and
commentators continue to believe that every fact occurring within
the boundaries of a state supports some vague, unstated argument
for applying that state's domestic law to the case at hand, regardless
of the policy or policies of that domestic law. For such judges and
commentators, the arguments for applying Wisconsin law will seem
to have been overwhelming: for example, Hague's NIN driver
insurance contract was purchased by him in Wisconsin, a state
whose domestic law would have upheld the validity of its
other-insurance reduction clauses. 1 5 But was the rule validating
such clauses supposed to apply to all such contracts made in
Wisconsin? Suppose the insured and his family had been domiciled
in a state that invalidated such clauses. Was the policy in the Nelson
case supposed to apply to such a case? Suppose Hague had made his
insurance contract in Minnesota where he was employed. Would it
have made sense to hold that, in such a case, the other-insurance
clause would be invalid, but that in the present case it must be held
binding? The single fact of two persons making a contract in a state
whose law would sustain its validity cannot, in and of itself, give
that state a legitimate claim to have the contract enforced against the
contrary claim of another state more significantly connected to
either of the parties.
There was another Wisconsin contact that did not support the
application of Wisconsin law: the tortious act that caused Hague's
death had occurred in Wisconsin. Because the state in which a
person has been killed might have a concern that potential medical
and funeral expenses owing to its citizens should be paid, it might
be argued that Wisconsin would have an interest in the application
of its insurance law to any available insurance, payable to Hague's

15. Since plaintiff's counsel assumed these clauses were valid in Wisconsin, we do
so for purposes of argument.
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estate. That the state of injury has such an interest in available
insurance is supported by the Watson and Clay cases. 16 But
Wisconsin could have no such interest in Hague's case because the
effect of applying its law would have been to diminish the sum
recoverable under Hague's policy. The only policy of Wisconsin
law that would appear to command serious attention could be
described as follows. The Wisconsin court, having considered its
statutes requiring that NIN driver insurance be provided for all
purchasers of liability insurance, had held that the legislature did not
intend to abandon a general policy of freedom of contract,
beneficial though that policy might be to the insurance companies.
Assuming, then, that the Wisconsin legislature did favor a policy of
freedom of contract as one beneficial to all members of the
community, the case of Ralph Hague, who had made his home in
Wisconsin and who had purchased a NIN driver policy from an
insurance company doing business in Wisconsin, would appear to
fall within the ambit of that Wisconsin policy. If we are to be totally
fair to the potential policies of Wisconsin law, we should recognize
that Wisconsin law may well have reflected a policy favoring
reduction clauses appropriately applicable to the case of Lavinia
Hague. 17
VIII. Analysis of the Opinions of the Minnesota Supreme Court

Speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court of Minnesota with
reference to the Nelson case, Justice Yetka wrote:
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has articulated its state policy of
16. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. (1954) 348 U.S. 66, 75 S. Ct.
166, 99 L.Ed. 74: Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. (1960) 377 U.S. 179: 84 S. Ct.
1197: 12 L.Ed. 229(1964).
17. That Ralph Hague's car was at all times garaged in Wisconsin is a contact

absolutely devoid of any policy significance for choice-of-law purposes. In the first
place, the accident in question had absolutely nothing to do with any of Hague's

automobiles. Furthermore, the insurance company had undertaken responsibility
for injuries inflicted by a NIN driver anywhere in the United States or Canada. This
mysterious allusion to the place where the plaintiff's or defendant's car was usually
garaged has become a kind of standard form in judicial opinions. It is, of course,
true that insurance premiums are in part based upon previous loss experience
involving cars garaged in the rating territory where the insured's car is garaged. But

it has been conclusively demonstrated that when cars from a particular state are
involved in accidents outside that state, the occurrence of that loss will have
virtually no effect on the general level of premiums in that state. See Morris,
Enterprise Liability and the ActuarialProcess - The Insignificance of Foresight,
70 Yale L.J. 554 (1961); Currie, Review of Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, (1964)
Duke L.J. 424 at 432.
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insuring minimum recovery on the part of victims of uninsured
motorists. This policy may be based, in part, on a desire to keep
insurance premiums low while providing some protection against
uninsured motorists."'
Justice Yetka was probably correct in suggesting that the decision
in the Nelson case, which enforced an unambiguous clause
restricting each victim of a NIN driver to recovery under one policy
only, would depress the premiums paid for such insurance by all
residents of Wisconsin. 1 9 He wisely refrained from suggesting that
the application of the contrary Minnesota rule in the Hague case
(and in other identical cases occurring in the same year) would, in
the future, have the effect of increasing those premiums.
Concerning the fixing of liability insurance premiums, it has been
conclusively demonstrated that the complex techniques used for
forecasting future liabilities to be generated by cars garaged in a
particular rating territory operate in such a way that shifts in
choice-of-law methodology have little or no effect upon such
forecasts. Choice-of-law cases, allocated to a single-rating territory,
are so few in proportion to the number of nonconflict cases used in
making the forecast that their effect is usually of little or no
significance. 20 The same is doubtless true of the methods used to
forecast damages to be inflicted by NIN drivers for which the
insurer will be liable.
Unfortunately, Justice Otis (dissenting) introduced a totally
fallacious and discredited theory into the case to support the
application of Wisconsin law. Justice Otis wrote that:
The rights of this defendant [Allstate] which are, in my opinion,
constitutionally protected, were vested at the time it entered into
its contract for insurance with the decedent in Wisconsin [June 8,
1974] prior to July 1, 1974 [date of the collision]. At that time
stacking had been held unavailable by the Wisconsin court in its
Nelson decision, filed May 20, 1974. Defendant had a right to
18.

Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W. 2d 43 at 47.
19. Morris,supra, n. 17.
20. Morris, supra, n. 17. See also discussions of the actuarial methods by which
insurance premiums are fixed in Hancock, Some Choice-of-Law Problems Posed
by Antiguest Statutes: Realism in Wisconsin and Rule-Fetishism in New York, 27
Stan. L.Rev. 775 at 780: Hancock, Anti-Guest Statutes and Marital Immunity for
Torts in Conflict of Laws: Techniques for Resolving Ostensible True Conflict Cases
and Constitutional Limitations, I Dalhousie L.J. 105 at 139; Hancock, Policy
Controlled State Interest Analysis in Choice of Law, Measure of Damages, Torts
Cases, October 1977 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 799 at 805.
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rely on that decision in fixing its rates and in actuarially
assessing its exposure (emphasis added).21
The italicized words above embody a tiresome old fallacy first
suggested by Ehrenzweig in 1960.22 Some judges still insist on
rehearsing the fallacy, although it was completely discredited by
Morris in 1961. Insurance actuaries, in fixing premiums, do not,
and could not, rely upon the potential application of particular rules
of domestic laws, such as that of the Nelson case or choice-of-law
methodology. Since 1961, Ehrenzweig's error has been analyzed
23
and exposed by commentators and judges alike.
How shall we explain Justice Otis' strange misconceptions of the
actuarial process? One cannot help wondering why he and his
colleague, Justice Petersen, should have been so concerned about
the possibility that an insurance corporation might have failed to
foresee the possible application of Minnesota law. Forecasting risks
of loss is the principal business of insurers, an activity in which they
have the assistance of experienced actuaries and attorneys. Why
should a judge, who knows relatively little about the problems they
face, feel it necessary to come to their assistance? One suspects that
Justice Otis and his colleague in dissent held a strong opinion that
Wisconsin law, which validated the reduction clauses, ought to be
applied for reasons not connected with the insurer's calculations.
This suspicion gains support from the fallacious choice of law
technique, popular with some judges and even a few commentators,
known as "grouping of contacts" or "finding the center of
gravity". This technique permits and encourages the judge to apply
the law of that state with which the parties and the facts have the
most numerous contacts, even though some or all of those contacts
are quite unrelated to any policy embodied in the domestic law of
that state. This technique is much easier to use than that of choosing
a rule of domestic law because the facts fall within the legitimate
range of its underlying policy. The latter technique may involve
some hard thinking about the purposes of a given rule and the rules'
relative importance. One must also consider the actual effect of that
rule on human behavior and whether it has had unexpected
consequences. Many judges will also want to inquire as to whether
its policies have become anachronistic in a modem context.
21. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, n. 18 at 54.
22. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, 582-583.
23. For citations to commentators, see, supra, notes 17 and 20. See also, for
example, Miller v. Miller (1968) 22 N.Y. 2d 12, 237 N.E. 2d 877.
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Justice Otis made no secret of his preference for the "centre of
gravity" technique. He discussed at great length the earlier
Minnesota case of Bolgrean v. Stich, decided in 1972.24 Its fact-law
pattern had presented a false conflict problem, analogous to that in
Babcock v. Jackson. 2 5 However, Justice Kelly, writing for the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in the Bolgrean case, decided to
employ the "center of gravity" technique. He carefully counted the
contacts with the three states involved - Minnesota, South Dakota,
and North Dakota. He then announced that Minnesota was the
winner of the title "the center of gravity"; hence, its law should be
applied. Mr. Justice Kelly also stated that "[i]n addition to the fact
that Minnesota is the center of gravity of the contacts, this state has
26
the greaterinterest in applying its law."
In applying the center of gravity technique to the Hague case,
Justice Otis concluded that Wisconsin had the largest number of
factual contacts and, thus, its law, as embodied in the Nelson case,
should be applied. However, as our review of those Wisconsin
contacts clearly showed, they were contacts without legal policy
consequences. With one possible exception, none of them was so
related to a Wisconsin policy as to show that the range of that policy
reached the present case.
In the Bolgrean case, Justice Kelly's resort to the fallacious
technique of counting insignificant contacts in order to find a
"center of gravity" did not result in an indefensible decision; a
policy-determined analysis would have reached the same result. He
merely overloaded his opinion with some unconvincing arguments.
But Justice Otis' use of the same technique in the Hague case could
have led to a most unfortunate result if only one more of his
colleagues had joined him. However, the three-judge minority of
the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the contacts with
Minnesota justified the application of its law, thereby invalidating
the reduction clauses. Employing the analytical framework of five
27
choice-of-law influencing considerations, developed by Leflar,
they relied particularly upon Leflar's fifth consideration, "application of the better rule of law". Because of the Minnesota rule,
invalidating reduction clauses would require the costs of accidents
24. (1972) 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W. 2d 442.
25. (1963) 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 191 N.E. 2d 279, 240 N.Y. S.2d 743.
26. Bolgrean v. Stitch, supra, note 24 at 10.
27. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 267 (1966).
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caused by NIN drivers to be spread more broadly across insurance
premiums. In view of this, the majority concluded that Minnesota
had the better law, and so entered judgment for Hague's estate.
Allstate's counsel then scored a signal success: they persuaded the
United States Supreme Court to review the case on constitutional
grounds. 28
IX. The NarrowerIssue Presentedby Supreme Court Review
Having shifted our focus on the Hague case to its consideration in
the United States Supreme Court, we have, at least temporarily,
narrowed the crucial issue. Speaking for the four-judge plurality
that prevailed in the federal Supreme Court, Justice Brennan stated
that issue as follows:
It is not for this court to say whether the choice-of-law analysis
suggested by Professor Leflar is to be preferred or whether we
would make the same choice-of-law decision if sitting as the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Our sole function is to determine
whether the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of its own
substantive law, in this case, exceeded federal constitutional
limitations. Implicit in this inquiry is the recognition, long
accepted by this court, that a set of facts, giving rise to a lawsuit
or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in
constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one
jurisdiction . . . As a result, the forum state may have to select
one law from among the laws of several jurisdictions having
some contact with the controversy.
In deciding constitutional choice of law questions, whether under
the due process clause or the full faith and credit clause, this court
has traditionally examined the contacts of the state whose law
was applied with the parties and with the occurrence or
transaction giving rise to the litigation . . . In order to ensure that
the choice of law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair . . . the court has invalidated the choice of law of a state
which has had no significant contact, or no significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with
the parties
29
and the occurrence or transaction (emphasis added).

28. (1980) 444 U.S. 1070, 100 S. Ct. This was the first time that the Supreme
Court had granted certiorari on a question involving nothing more than the
propriety of a state's choice of law since the granting of certiorari in the case of
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., supra, n. 16.
29. Allstate v. Hague, supra n. I at 637-38.
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X. Comparisonof Domicile Status and Employment Status

In order to realize fully the high degree of similarity between the
case of Ralph and Lavinia Hague and that of a husband and wife
domiciled at all times in Minnesota, consideration of such a
hypothetical case may be instructive. Suppose that both Ralph and
Lavinia Hague had been domiciled at the time of their marriage in
Minnesota, where Ralph was then employed. Assume also that they
rented a modest home in Red Wing. Two years later, Ralph
purchases in Wisconsin, from a friend selling Allstate policies
there, an insurance policy exactly like that in the actual case. Soon
thereafter, he is killed in Wisconsin by a NIN driver while a
passenger on his son's motorcycle, as in the actual case. (In this
hypothetical example, a post mortem change of domicile by Lavinia
Hague to Minnesota would have been impossible. That feature of
the real case will be discussed later.)
Assuming that Lavinia Hague then brought suit in a Minnesota
court for a declaration of her rights against Allstate, a judgment in
her favor surely would have ensued. The making of the contract in
Wisconsin and the death of Hague in that state would not have
provided any ground for resort to Wisconsin's rule validating
reduction clauses. 3 0 But Minnesota, as Lavinia's domicile, would
have had a strong interest in applying its invalidating rule to give her
a larger recovery under the policy. For the future, the nullification
of the reduction clauses would assure husbands in Minnesota who
purchased NIN driver insurance for their wives' protection that their
state would not permit reduction clauses to reduce that protection,
regardless of where the policy contract had been made or the death
had occurred.
XI. Home InsuranceCo. v. Dick: An Illustrationof the Rejection of
Domicile as a Contact ofAny Significance in Choice-of-Law Cases

Time was when the importance for choice-of-law purposes of a
man's domicile received scant consideration in torts and contract
cases. The traditional territorial system of Story, Dicey, Minor, and
Beale stressed so strongly the situs of acts and events that the law of
a person's domicile had come to have little significance when he
acted outside its territory. In the Supreme Court's oft cited, but
much misunderstood, decision of 1930 in Home Insurance Co. v.
30. See text, section VII.
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Dick, 3 1 C. J. Dick, an American citizen, was at all relevant times
domiciled in Texas. 32 In that state, the legislature had enacted, in
1909, a statute of a common type, designed to prevent insurance
companies and other wealthy and powerful debtors from inserting
clauses in their contracts limiting the time within which they might
be sued by their less experienced creditors. Those creditors, the
legislators believed, should be allowed sufficient time to decide
whether to consult an attorney and to give such an attorney, once
consulted, time to investigate his client's claim. Such clauses were
also considered objectionable because they deprived a citizen of
access to the courts of his state at a time when the limitation and
prescription statutes of that state had given him access. To obtain
the benefits of what was frequently a nonnegotiable adhesion
contract, the citizen was being forced to renounce, in part, one of
his basic civil rights. At the date of the Dick case, twenty-five states
had enacted such statutes nullifying time-of-suit clauses. 33 The
Texas statute read as follows: "No persons, firm, corporate
association or combination of whatsoever kind shall enter into any
stipulation, contract or agreement, by reason whereof, the time in
which to sue thereon is limited to a shorter period than two years.
And no stipulation, contract or agreement for any said shorter
period in which to sue shall ever be valid in this state (emphasis

added).1"34
On October 27, 1923, C. J. Dick filed suit in a Texas District
Court against Compania General Anglo-Mexican de Seguros, a
Mexican insurance company, for $35,000 allegedly owing to Dick
(and others) 35 under a policy insuring the tugboat Waverly against
loss or damage by fire in Mexican waters. The policy was approved
and accepted by the Mexican company, in Mexico, on March 18,
1921, to be in effect for one year thereafter. On July 27, 1921, the
tugboat caught fire and sank in the harbor of Tampico, Mexico.
31. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick (1930) 281 U.S. 397, 50 S. Ct. 338, 74 L.Ed.
926.
32. See Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 8 S.W. 2d 354 at 357 (Ct. of Civil Appeals
decision); Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 15 S.W. 2d 1028 at 1030 (Commission of
Appeals decision).
33. For a list of states nullifying time-of-suit clauses as of 1960, see the opinion of
Black J. (dissenting) in Clay v. Sun Life Ins. Office Ltd., supra, n. 16 at 215, n. I.
34. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra, n. 31 at 404-405.
35. Texas and Gulf Steamship Co. was an original party to the insurance policy.
At a subsequent date, Suderman and Young was allowed to intervene, but its
interest was held to be identical with Dick's.
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Since the Mexican company carried on no business whatsoever in
Texas, it was immune to suit in Texas courts. But the Franklin Fire
Insurance Company and the Home Insurance Company had each
entered into a contract of reinsurance with the Mexican company for
$15,000.36 Both of these companies carried on business 3 7 in Texas
and had appointed agents for service there, as was required by
Texas law. Notices of garnishment were served upon them in Dick's
suit against the Mexican company, alleging that their debts to the
Mexican company were pending the court's decision on Dick's
claim.
The trial judge found that, when the policy was issued, Dick was
"temporarily sojourning ' 3 8 in Mexico. That judge further found
"that the plaintiff, C. J. Dick, had a beneficial and insurable
interest in said vessel, and that said policy hereinabove described,
as originally issued, was for the benefit of the Plaintiff,C. J. Dick

and the Texas and Gulf Steamship Company, according to the
respective interests of said parties in said vessel (emphasis

added." 39 In the light of these findings of fact by the Texas trial
judge, the following statement of Justice Brandeis must be regarded
as somewhat misleading: "It (the policy) was issued by the Mexican
company in Mexico to one Bonner of Tampico, Mexico, and was
there duly assigned to Dick, prior to the loss."40 This "statement"
of the facts implied that after Bonner, a Mexican domiciliary, had
made a contract with the Mexican corporation to be performed in
Mexico, Dick had taken an assignment of Bonner's rights, and that
he then claimed his rights to be greater than Bonner's because he
was permanently domiciled in Texas. But Dick was, in fact, an
original party to the insurance contract holding an insurable interest
in the tug, Waverly. Only after he had become a party to the original
contract did Dick receive an assignment of Bonner's original
interest in the policy.
In the Texas courts, the garnishees (Home Insurance Co. and
Franklin Fire Insurance Company) relied upon the following clause
in the policy as a defense: "It is understood and agreed that no
judicial suit or demand shall be entered before any tribunal for the
36. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, Ct. of Civil Appeals decision, supra, n. 32 at 357.

37. Ibid. This finding was reiterated in the Commission of Appeals decision at
1029-30, and in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion at 404.
38. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, Ct. of Civil Appeals decision, supra, n. 32 at 357.

39. Ibid.
40. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra, n. 31 at 403.
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collection of any claim under this policy, unless such suits or
demands are filed within one year, counted as from the date on
which such damage occurs." 41 They also relied upon articles 1038,
1039, and 1043 of the Mexican Commercial Code, prescribing one
year as the time limited for suit to enforce a contract of insurance,
and a second clause in the policy incorporating by reference the time
limit of the Mexican Commercial Code.
It is high time to recall that we began this rather extended analysis
of the Dick case to demonstrate that, as recently as fifty years ago,
the laws and policies of a party's domicile had almost no effect upon
the solution of choice-of-law problems involving contracts. Though
all three of the Texas courts gave judgment in favor of Dick against
the garnishees, the judges' opinions were almost entirely devoted to
the endless conundrums of classification, 42 far removed from any
issue of social policy. They actually concluded that the time-of-suit
clauses in the policy had no effect on substantive rights of the
parties. 43 While holding that the contract clauses were contrary to
Texas' public policy, they did not explain how that policy had been
involved, that is, that the Texas legislature had, in 1909, indicated
its opinion that such clauses were unfair to creditors and that, in this
case, their enforcement would deprive a citizen of Texas of access
to the courts of his state, contrary to its laws.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, the Supreme Court
unanimously overruled the Texas courts' decision. Though his
opinion "containeth many points of good learning", its major
argument is briefly and pithily stated, as follows: "The Texas
statute, as here construed and applied, deprives the garnishees of
property without due process of law . . . . In the case at bar nothing
in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts of
reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas. All acts
relating to the making of the policy were done in Mexico. All in
relation to the making of the contracts of reinsurance were done
there or in New York. And, likewise, all things in regard to
performance were to be done outside of Texas." ' 44 Thus, in the
game of blindfold contact-counting, Mexico is a shut-out winner.
41. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, Ct. of Civil Appeals decision, supra, n. 32 at 356.
42. See Hancock, Policy Controlled State Interest Analysis in Choice of Law,
Measure of Damages, Torts Cases, supra, n. 20 at 819-824.
43. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, Commission of Appeals decision, supra, n. 32 at
1031.
44. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra, n. 31 at 407.
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But were not the Texas courts bound to give some serious
consideration to a strongly worded Texas statute in cases where the
rights of a Texas citizen are at stake? Justice Brandeis' response was
short and unequivocal: "The fact that Dick's permanent residence
was in Texas is without significance. At all times here material he
was physically present and acting in Mexico. Texas was, therefore,
45
without power to affect the terms of contracts so made."
Today, these sentences are of historical interest only. In three
subsequent cases involving claims against insurance companies, the
Supreme Court has stressed the significance for choice purposes of
beneficial law enacted in the state where the claimant suffering
46
damage to person or property has been domiciled .
XII. Evaluation of Ralph Hague's Employment Status as a
Significant Minnesota Contact
Returning to our hypothetical case wherein Ralph and Lavinia
Hague are assumed to have always been domiciled in Minnesota, let
us focus on the basic question: why should the courts of that state
apply that state's laws for the Hagues' benefit? It is common
practice to say of persons so situated that they are voting, taxpaying
members of the Minnesota community. But Ralph and Lavinia had
contributed much more to the state than taxes. For several years,
Ralph had given his knowledge, his skills, and his productive
energy to the Minnesota economy. The same would have been true
of Lavinia if she had been gainfully employed. In any event, we
should assume that she aided and supported Ralph by performing
some or all of the homemaking tasks a wife usually assumes and, by
her tender companionship, gave him a sense of joie de vivre and
self-fulfillment that only a true wife can bring to her mate. Thus,
she made him a happier and more creative person in relation to his
employment.
How do these contributions of Ralph and Lavinia to the
Minnesota economy relate to their insurance policy? The answer is
very simple: when a husband buys insurance covering his death, his
principal motive is to protect his wife against poverty and
45. Id. at 408.
46. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n (1939) 306 U.S.
493, 59 S.Ct. 629, 83 L.Ed. 940: Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,
supra, n. 16: Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., supra, n. 16. It would be impractical to
attempt to cite all the cases in which state courts have given great weight to the
domicile of one or both of the parties.
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destitution. The state of his and her common domicile has
necessarily a very powerful concern to carry out his objective. That
concern should suffice to bring all insurance benefits payable on his
death within the potential scope of the state's insurance laws.
We may now return to the original, actual case by supposing that,
after Ralph and Lavinia had lived as man and wife in Minnesota for
a few years (and before any other facts had occurred), they had
moved into a handsome old house in Hager City, Wisconsin, that
Lavinia's great-aunt had devised to her. From that time forward,
they received police protection as property owners, making their
home in Wisconsin and paying taxes on the newly-acquired house in
Hager City. Ralph, with Lavinia's wifely support, continued to earn
his living in Minnesota and to pay income tax to that state. To
complete the picture of the actual case, we must further assume that
the NIN driver insurance was purchased and the fatal accident
occurred in Wisconsin. (Lavinia's post-mortem change of domicile
we shall reserve for further discussion.) Thus, we reach the crucial
question: if, when Ralph and Lavinia were both domiciled in
Minnesota, that state had a strong concern for the application of its
rule, invalidating the reduction clauses of their policy, why should
that strong concern not have continued as long as Ralph, with
Lavinia's wifely support, continued to contribute his skills,
knowledge, and productive energy to the Minnesota economy and
to pay taxes to Minnesota as well? The question surely appears to
answer itself, for whether Ralph chose to make his home (that is, to
dine, sleep, and eat breakfast) in Minnesota, Wisconsin, or Canada,
his contribution of work and taxes to Minnesota would remain
sufficient to give that state a strong and legitimate concern to help
him provide for his wife after his death.
Speaking for the plurality of four judges who (with Justice
Stevens concurring in a separate opinion) affirmed the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision, Justice Brennan articulated most of the
argument hitherto set forth. He clearly recognized that Hague's
Minnesota employment conferred on him a status such that that
state's concern for his welfare and safety was affected by his injury
or death outside its borders. Thus he wrote: "That Mr. Hague was
not killed while commuting to work or while in Minnesota does not
dictate a different result [that is, exclusion of Hague from
Minnesota's interest and concern]. To hold that the Supreme Court
of Minnesota's choice of Minnesota law violated the Constitution
for that reason would require too narrow a view of Minnesota's
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relationship with the parties and the occurrence giving rise to the
litigation. An automobile accident need not occur within a particular
jurisdiction for that jurisdiction to be connected to the occurrence.
Similarly, the occurrence of a crash, fatal to a Minnesota employee,
in another state is a Minnesota contact. 47
In stressing the importance of Ralph Hague's contribution to the
general economy of Minnesota, Justice Brennan unfortunately
failed to mention Lavinia's wifely support and the taxes they paid to
Minnesota. But even without referring to these significant factors,
he succeeded in showing Minnesota's concern, not only for its
employees during their lives, but for the "vindication of the rights
of the estate of a Minnesota employee." Thus he wrote:
First, and for our purposes, a very important contact, Mr. Hague
was a member of Minnesota's workforce .

.

. While employ-

ment status may implicate a state interest less substantial than
does residence status, that interest is nevertheless important. The
state of employment has police power responsibilities toward the
non-resident employee that are analogous, if somewhat less
profound, than toward residents. . .The state's interest in its
commuting, non-resident employees reflects a state concern for
the safety and well-being of its workforce and the concomitant
effect on Minnesota employers .. .If Mr. Hague had only been
injured and missed work for a few weeks, the effect on the
Minnesota employer would have been palpable and Minnesota's
interest in having its employee made whole would be evident. Mr.
Hague's death affects Minnesota's interests still more acutely
even though Mr. Hague will not return to the Minnesota
workforce. Minnesota's workforce is surely affected by the level
of protection the state extends to it, either directly or indirectly.
Vindication of the rights of the estate of a Minnesota employee,
therefore, is an important state concern (emphasis added). 48
As Professor Weintraub has suggested, Minnesota might very
properly have required Hague's employer to contribute to insurance
on Hague's life payable to his estate. 49 Since Hague had already
purchased NIN driver insurance payable to his estate, the Minnesota
court had merely claimed for that state the power to invalidate
clauses that were unfair and oppressive under Minnesota law. As a
corporate member of the Minnesota economic community, Allstate
was clearly bound to submit to all reasonable regulations of its
transactions with Minnesota citizens or persons entitled to the
47. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 641.

48. Id. at 640-641.
49. Weintraub, supra, n. 6 at 29.

674 The Dalhousie Law Journal

protection of Minnesota laws, such as a long-time member of the
Minnesota workforce.
XIII. Justice Powell's Narrow Interpretation of Hague's Employment Status

It is not easy to understand how, in his well-informed and
perceptive opinion, Justice Powell came to disagree with Justice
Brennan about the very existence of Minnesota's concern for the
widow of a long-time member of that state's workforce and his
desires to provide for her on his death. Concerning the general
principles established by prior Supreme Court decisions, the two
judges seem to have been generally in agreement. Thus, Justice
Powell wrote: "The Court should invalidate a forum state's decision
to apply its own law only when there are no significant contacts
between the state and the litigation (emphasis added).''50 Further

on in his opinion, he wrote: "Nonetheless, for a forum state to
further its legitimate public policy by applying its own state law to a
controversy there must be some connection between the facts giving
rise to the litigation and the scope of the state's lawmaking
jurisdiction."'-' He concluded his summary of general doctrine as
follows: "the state has a legitimate interest in applying a rule of
decision to the litigation only if the facts, to which the rule will be
applied, have created effects within the state toward which the
state's public policy is directed. To assess the sufficiency of
asserted contacts between the forum and the litigation the court must
determine if the contacts form a reasonable link between the
litigation and a state policy. In short, examination of contacts
addresses whether the state has an interest in the application of its
52
policy in this instance. If it does, the Constitution is satisfied."
As has already been explained, the Minnesota court's invalidation of the reduction clauses in Ralph Hague's policy (by applying
Minnesota law) effectuated that state's concern for the welfare of an
employee's wife after his death, as well as its concern that his plan
to protect her by accident insurance on his life should produce the
maximum recovery. But Justice Powell emphatically refused to
recognize any such Minnesota concerns, saying that "[t]he
insured's place of employment is not, however, significant in this
50. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 650 (opinion of Powell J., dissenting).
51. ld. at651.
52. Id. at 651-652.
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case. Neither the nature of the insurance policy, the events related to
the accident, nor the immediate question of stacking coverages, are
in any way affected or implicated by the insured's employment
status . . . .Minnesota does not wish its workers to die in
automobile accidents. But permitting stacking will not further this

interest.

53

But why should Minnesota's concerns be so narrowly circumscribed by the Supreme Court? As Justice Brennan noted, the
death of Hague in Wisconsin had drastic effects in Minnesota. It
prevented him from ever returning to his work in that state and
54
stopped the flow of income from that state to Lavinia Hague.
These unfortunate results cannot be prevented, but they can be
alleviated. Minnesota can, and should, declare its concern for the
fairness and legality of clauses in accident insurance policies issued
to its nonresident employers, and so apply its law invalidating
reduction clauses.
XIV. The Significance of Allstate's Extensive Business Activities in
Minnesota
What significance should Minnesota have attached to the extensive
business carried on in its territory by Allstate? If the persons and
events of a given case had no other connection with Minnesota
except that the cause of action was based upon a policy issued by
Allstate, its judges would have had in personam jurisdiction over
Allstate, but no rational ground for applying its substantive law. But
if Hague had been at all times domiciled in Minnesota, that state
would surely have had very just grounds for, in effect, saying to
Allstate, "Since you are a member of this economic community,
licensed to carry on profitable trade here, you must submit to the
rules of our law in your transactions with our citizens."
Now, although Hague had not made his home in Minnesota, he
had, as we have noted, made a substantial contribution to its
economy by his services and had paid the same income tax as a
domiciled citizen. Moreover, his death in Wisconsin had had drastic
consequences in Minnesota. His wife's right to have Minnesota law
applied to her claim against Allstate was surely as strong as that of
the wife of a domiciled Minnesotan would have been. In other
words, we have here a situation in which the choice of law
53. Id. at 654.

54. Id. at 640-642.
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consequences of a particular contact (Allstate's membership in the
Minnesota economic community) depended almost entirely upon
the presence of another contact, namely, Hague's contribution to
the Minnesota community of his services and income tax.
XV. Post-Occurrence Change of Domicile to a State Hitherto
Unconnected with the Facts: Unfairness to the Nonchanging Party
The notion that a man, who, having established his home in one
state, works all day in another, makes a greater economic
contribution to the state of service, rather than to the former state,
has come to modern choice-of-law doctrine as a startling novelty.
Traditionally, the community within the boundaries of which a man
ate, drank, and slept regularly has always been considered to be the
community of which he was a member for all legal purposes
affected by such membership. That community lawyers have called
his "domicile" or "permanent residence". 55 Choice-of-law
significance was attributed to the law of a state wherein a person
was employed only in situations where the employee was injured or
killed in the course of his work, or while travelling to or from his
56
place of work.
Had the choice-of-law importance of the state of service been
more generally recognized, the Supreme Court might have found it
unnecessary to consider whether, and to what extent, Lavinia
Hague's post mortem change of domicile supported Minnesota's
claim to apply its law. It is fortunate, however, that Justice Brennan
decided to consider that issue, for few problems of modern
choice-of-law doctrine have generated as much controversy as that
of post-occurrence change of domicile. 5 7 Justice Brennan's
analysis, though not wholly flawless, points the way to a sensible
and realistic solution of the problem.
55. Older statutes and constitutions generally use the term "residence"

with the

same meaning as that of "domicile". Judges frequently use it with this meaning
also. Modem commentators do not use the word "residence" without some
qualifying adjective: when they mean domicile, they use the expression
'permanent residence". When they mean a presence in the territory that does not
amount to domicile, they use the expression "temporary residence". See Reese
and Green, That Elusive Word Residence, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 561 (1953).
56. See, for example, Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co. (1947) 330 U.S. 469, 67
S.Ct. 801, 91 L.Ed. 1028 (discussed inAllstate v. Hague at 641-642).
57. See Hancock, The Effect in Choice of Law Cases of the Acquisition of a New
Domicile After the Commission of a Tort on the Making of a Contract, 2 int. &
Comp. L. Rev. 215, (1979)at 215-217.
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To illustrate the problem in its simplest form, let us consider a
hypothetical variation of the Hague case. Suppose that Laura and
Rudy Hugg make their home after marriage in Hager City,
Wisconsin, where Rudy raises poultry and pigs on fifty acres of
Wisconsin land. From Allstate, he purchases a policy of NIN driver
insurance covering three, cars owned by him, to the amount of
$15,000 each, a policy exactly like that held by Ralph Hague, but
containing the following reduction clause not in Hague's policy:
"Allstate shall not be liable in any event for more than $15,000 to
compensate for the wrongful injury or death of any one person."
Assume that Rudy Hugg is killed in Wisconsin on the same day as
Ralph Hague, under identical circumstances, by a NIN driver. He
had not, at any material time, worked or carried on business in
Minnesota. Soon after his death, Laura Hugg moves to Red Wing,
Minnesota, where she makes her home. Ten months after Rudy's
death, she marries a Minnesota domiciliary and lives with him in
that state. Less than two years after Rudy Hugg's death, Laura
Hugg brings suit in a Minnesota court against Allstate for a
declaration that she was entitled to recover $45,000 under Huggs'
NIN driver policy (which was identical to Hague's, except for the
reduction clause quoted above). Under the Wisconsin cases, this
clearly expressed clause would have been valid, and Wisconsin's
declared policy of freedom of contract obviously applied to a
contract between a Wisconsin domiciliary and an insurance
company licensed to do business there.
When Laura decided to make her home in Minnesota, the
American Constitution compelled that state to accept her as a newly
domiciled citizen. 5 8 The government of Minnesota thereby became
obliged to protect her from poverty and destitution. Likewise, that
state had the power to enforce in its courts any obligation legally
owing to Laura Hugg as a consequence of her husband's death,
subject, of course, to all legal defences of the obligor. Thus, the
Minnesota court would be faced with a true conflict case: a conflict
314 U.S. 160, held that "the right to move
freely from state to state is an incident of national citizenship protected by the
privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment against state
interference." See also Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618 (held
unconstitutional statute which denies welfare assistance to residents of a state who
have not resided in the state for at least one year immediately preceding their
58. Edwards v. California (1941)

application for such assistance); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, (1974)

415 U.S. 250 (held unconstitutional statute requiring residence in a county as a
condition for indigent's receiving nonemergency assistance at county's expense).
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between Wisconsin's freedom-of-contract-for-insurers policy and
Minnesota's policy protecting its citizen, Laura Hugg, against the
reduction clause in her first husband's insurance contract. The
resolution of such conflicts between the divergent and overlapping
rules (and policies) of two states constitutes the central problem
confronting courts in some choice-of-law cases today. 5 9 Indeed, it
has always been the central problem in some choice cases, but its
presence was concealed by the devoted adherence of judges and
commentators to a set of territorial slogans that refused all
recognition to the laws of the parties' domiciles in tort and contract
cases. With the adoption of a new judicial approach to choice
problems that begins with an analysis of local domestic laws and
their policies, the important distinction between true conflicts and
false conflicts has come to light. Moreover, commentators and
judges have devised certain techniques by which the selection of
one of two conflicting rules may be explained and justified in a
rational manner, calculated to prevent, or at least alleviate,
interstate friction and hostility that might lead to interstate
retaliation.
But consideration of all the relevant policies involved in Laura
Hugg's case brings to our attention a policy issue that is not directly
related to either Minnesota's or Wisconsin's domestic law; it is an
issue solely derived from the existence of different communities,
each occupying a defined territory and making its own laws for its
own people. In the specific terms of Laura Hugg's case, the issue
may be stated as follows. After Rudy Hugg's death had, under
Wisconsin law, created a cause of action for only $15,000 against
Allstate, would it not have been, in some degree, unfair to Allstate
to permit Laura, by her unilateral, self-determined act of changing
her domicile, to establish a law-selecting contact with Minnesota
solely for her own advantage? Needless to say, Allstate had done
nothing to cause or encourage Laura to change her domicile. Before
Laura, by her change of domicile, gave Minnesota a concern for her
future welfare, the only law applicable (namely, Wisconsin's)
limited Allstate's liability to $15,000. If the law of Laura's newly
chosen domicile, Minnesota, were to be applied, Allstate would be
deprived of its protective limitation, which is valid under Wisconsin
59. See Hancock, supra, n. 57 at 218; Hancock, Anti-Guest Statutes and Marital
Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws: Techniques for Resolving Ostensible True
Conflict Cases and ConstitutionalLimitations (1973) supra, n. 20 at 126-128, and
131-140.
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law, and subject to a judgment for $45,000. In other words, prior to
Laura's one-sided change of domicile, all the operative facts, on
which her claim depended, had occurred in Wisconsin. Nothing
happened thereafter to justify resort to the law of Minnesota, except
Laura's one-sided act of changing her domicile. Moreover, by her
one-sided act, Wisconsin's policy of freedom of contract for its
licensed insurers who sell NIN driver insurance to Wisconsin
citizens would have been subverted in this and all similar cases.
Incidentally, by declining to permit Laura, of her own volition, to
bring Minnesota law and policy into the case after her loss had been
suffered, the court would avoid the difficulty of resolving a true
conflict problem.
Even for this particular case, however, the resolution arrived at
cannot be considered wholly satisfactory. Minnesota has been
forced to accept Laura Hugg as a new citizen, with a corresponding
liability for her welfare. Under Minnesota's domestic law, the
reduction clauses in her policy would be treated as oppressive and
void. But Minnesota's domestic policy, which was designed to
protect Laura and other citizens, conflicts with judicial notions of
fairness to Allstate. Thus, Minnesota's policy will be subverted
because Laura alone created her Minnesota contact after her cause
of action had accrued. The resulting decision is still a compromise
of the type that courts must often reach, faut de mieux, in true
conflict cases. 60 Though we may agree that Laura Hugg should not
be permitted to add $30,000 to her claim against Allstate by making
her home in Minnesota after her cause of action for $15,000 had
accrued, the rule adopted in this case should not be elevated to the
status of a fundamental constitutional principle.
XVI. Post-Occurrence Change of Domicile to a State Previously
Connected with the Facts: A Situation Where the Moving Party is
Already Entitledto the Protectionof the Law of his New Domicile
While Lavinia Hague's post-accrual change of domicile differed no
whit from that of Laura Hugg, it was combined with an additional
important fact, not present in Laura Hugg's case, namely, Ralph
Hague's fifteen years of commuting to Minnesota and his daily
60. Had the court attempted to give consideration to Minnesota's undoubted
concern for Laura Hugg's welfare as a new citizen, the case would have presented a
true conflict. By its determination that such consideration would be unfair to
Allstate, the court did not have to grapple with the true conflict problem.
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employment there. The various Minnesota concerns for Lavinia's
welfare and Ralph's plans for it after his death, stemming from his
status as a nonresident employee, have already been discussed.
That status and the Minnesota concerns engendered by it called
for a very different result in the Hague case. A careful distinction
should be drawn between it and the Hugg case. Prior to Laura
Hugg's removal to Minnesota, her claim against Allstate had been
solely governed by Wisconsin law, under which the policy of
freedom of contract for insurers would have unquestionably
required a judgment for no more than $15,000. At that point, the
case did not raise any choice-of-law problem at all. It was a purely
domestic Wisconsin case in which Allstate had an ironclad defence.
Totally different was the situation in the Hague case. Upon his
death, it presented a difficult true conflict problem; Allstate had no
ironclad defence to Lavinia's claim, insofar as it rested on
Minnesota's concerns for Ralph as a longtime employee and for her
as his wife. Disregarding Lavinia's change of domicile would not
resolve the true conflict. On the other hand, as has been noted,
Minnesota's concern for Lavinia has actually been increased by her
removal there, even though consideration of this fact may be in
some degree unfair to Allstate. Assuming Minnesota's total concern
for Lavinia's welfare has been increased, how are the judges
supposed to separate from the remainder that portion that resulted
from her change of domicile?
The suggestion has elsewhere been ventured by the present
writer that when one party's change of domicile has not been the
sole source and cause of a state's concern in a true conflict problem,
the judges need not and should not attempt to separate that state's
concern into two parts in the course of considering their decision. 6 1
They should, rather, give such effect to that state's total concern as
they believe it to deserve in light of the policies involved. This was,
in effect, the course taken by Justice Brennan; for the plurality, he
wrote that:
Respondent became a Minnesota resident prior to the institution
of this litigation. The stipulated facts reveal that she first settled
in Red Wing, Minnesota, the town where her late husband had
worked .

.

. While John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.

v. Yates held that a post-occurrence change of residence to the
forum state was insufficient, in and of itself, to confer power on
the forum state to choose its law, that case did not hold that such
61. See Hancock, supra, note 57 at 228-234.
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a change of residence was irrelevant. Here, of course,
respondent's bona fide residence in Minnesota was not the sole
contact Minnesota had with this litigation .

. .

. Respondent's

residence .. constitute[s] a Minnesota contact which gives
Minnesota an interest in respondent's recovery, an interest which
the court below identified as full compensation for "resident
accident victims" to keep them "off welfare rolls" and "able to
meet financial obligations." In sum, Minnesota had a significant
aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence,
creating state interests, such that application of its law was
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the
choice of Minnesota law by the Minnesota Supreme Court did not
violate 6the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. 2

XVII. Analysis of the Yates Case of 1936: Justice Brandeis'
Decision as Affected by the Dick Case of 1930
The famous old case of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Yates 63 received far more attention in the instant litigation than it
deserved. It was decided by the Supreme Court almost fifty years
ago, in 1936, a time when the overlapping, elastic slogans, known
as choice-of-law principles, accorded no influence to the law of the
state of a party's domicile in torts and contract cases. This exclusion
was so generally accepted that counsel, in attempting to suggest that
a citizen of the forum deserved the benefit of rules of the forum's
domestic law, usually argued that the pertinent rules should be
classified as remedial or procedural. We have already considered
this problem of counsel (and of judges, as well) and their strategy to
64
circumvent it in our discussion of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick.
There, Justice Brandeis refused to classify the Texas statute banning
time-of-suit clauses as a rule of Texas procedure to be followed in
all litigation in Texas courts. Though Dick had purchased insurance
from a Mexican insurer in Mexico, covering the loss of his tugboat
only in Mexican waters where it had burned and sunk, Dick had at
all times been a domiciled citizen of Texas (and, therefore, the
United States). But Justice Brandeis rejected any suggestion that
Dick could, in a Texas court, be entitled to the protection of the
Texas statute banning time-of-suit clauses. "The fact that Dick's

62. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 643-644.
63. (1936) 229 U.S. 178,57S. Ct. 129,81 L.Ed. 106.

64. See text, section XI.
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permanent residence was in Texas," he wrote, "is without
65
significance."
It is only against this background of general professional
consensus (and Justice Brandeis' views in particular) that his
opinion in the Yates case can be properly interpreted and
understood. In May 1932, Harmon Yates and his wife were both
domiciled in New York, where he purchased a policy of life
insurance from the John Hancock Insurance Company for $2,000.
During the ensuing month, he died of cancer. The company refused
66
payment on the ground that Yate's applications, signed by him,
contained material false answers to two questions: "Have you ever
been treated for cancer of indigestion? Have you had medical advice
from any other disease or disorder during the five years preceding
this application?" The company claimed to have proof that Yates
had had medical treatment five times within the month preceding
the application. Under New York law, Yates was responsible for the
truth of the answers, even though the company's agent had written
them in the form. Under New York cases, these false answers were
material to the risk assumed by the company. Consequently, the
company's apparent promise was void.
Yate's widow, the beneficiary of the policy, removed to Georgia
and brought suit in that state's courts. The company's proof of the
falsity of answers in the application was not disputed. Neither was
its proof of New York law. But the trial court refused to enforce the
New York law. Instead, it left the issue of the policy's validity to
the jury with instructions to find for the plaintiff if they believed that
the deceased Yates had given truthful oral answers to the agent or if
they believed that the answers of the deceased, though false, were
not material to the risk. The trail court's rejection of New York law
and resort to Georgia law were sustained by the higher Georgia
courts on the grounds that the New York law had been properly
classified as remedial or procedural. 67
Justice Brandeis easily demolished this fictitious classification of
the New York law. Indeed, two of the five judges in the Georgia
Supreme Court had expressed their strong dissent against it. There
65. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick. supra, n. 31 at 408.
66. See Hancock, supra, n. 57 at 223-225. The Supreme Court does not say that
Yates signed the application; this fact appears in the Georgia report (1936) 182 Ga.
213, 221, 185 S.E. at 273 (dissenting opinion of Justice Gilbert).
67. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates (1935), 50 Ga. App. 619, 179
S.E. 239:(1936) 182 Ga. 213, 185 S.E. 268.
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remained, however, the question whether Georgia law might be
considered as expressing a policy concern for the widow Yates, who
had become domiciled there. On this point, Justice Brandeis was
exceedingly terse: "In respect to the accrual of the right asserted
under the contract or liability denied, there was no occurrence,
nothing done to which the law of Georgia could apply. Compare
68
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick."
A law student of today, unacquainted with the Dick case, might
well wonder why Justice Brandeis did not mention the unfairness to
the company of allowing the widow, by changing her domicile, to
bring Georgia law into the case for her benefit. Justice Brandeis was
certainly not the man to leave an argument half stated. The reason
for his terseness lay in his citation of the Dick case, in which Dick
had been domiciled in Texas throughout the entire transaction. His
domicile had, nevertheless, been held to be "without significance".
In the Yates case, Justice Brandeis was not particularly concerned
with the timing of Mrs. Yates' removal to Georgia. Her domicile
there was, in any case, without significance.
We have already noted that, today, judges employing state
interest analysis regard the domicile of one party as a strong ground,
in most cases, for applying the law of that party's state. 69 This view
finds support in several U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Justice
Brandeis' decision upon the fact-law pattern of the Yates case
remains sound. But his sweeping negative statement, excluding
Mrs. Yates' Georgia domicile from all consideration, would today
require some further explanation, showing the unfairness of
allowing her to introduce Georgia law into the case at such a late
date.
XVIII. Justice Powell's Misconception of the Dick and Yates Cases
To Justice Brennan's contention that the Yates case was
distinguishable from the Hague case because Mrs. Hague's
post-occurrence domicile was not the sole contact with Minnesota,
Justice Powell (dissenting) somewhat rashly replied that "[t]he
post-accident residence of the plaintiff beneficiary is constitutionally irrelevant to the choice-of-law question . . . .What the Yates
68. 299 U.S. at 182.
69. See the cases cited at, supra, n. 46, and Carroll v. Lanca (1955) 349 U.S.
408, 75 S. Ct.. 804, 99 L. Ed. 1183. For a state court decision strongly emphasizing
the importance of domicile, see, for example, Rosenthal v. Warren (1973) 475 F.
2d 438, affirming (1972) 342 F. Supp 246.
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court held, however, was that there was no occurrence, nothing
70
done, to which the law of Georgia could apply."
Why Justice Brandeis believed, in 1936, that this sweeping
statement was permissible has already been explained. In any event,
Justice Brandeis and the Yates court had no power to make a rule
covering a state of facts other than those before them. 71 Continuing
his argument, Justice Powell wrote: "Any possible ambiguity in the
court's view of the significance of a post-occurrence change of
residence is dispelled by Home Insurance Co. v. Dick above, cited
by the Yates court, where it was held squarely that Dick's
72
post-accident move to the forum state was without significance."
This last sentence clearly indicates a total misconception of the
facts of the Dick case. As the quotation above from the Dick case
tells us, 73 what was held to be "without significance" was "the fact
that Dick's permanent residence was in Texas." 74 Dick was never
at any time domiciled in Mexico. 7 5 The case is totally irrelevant to
76
the change of domicile issue.
XIX. Justice Powell's Criticism of the Plurality Opinion for its
Reliance on Purely Physical Contacts Having No Relation to
Minnesota Policies
As has been noted earlier, a not uncommon fallacy of judicial
reasoning is the attempt to bolster the choice of a rule of domestic
law by referring to contacts totally unrelated to the policy of the
70. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 653.
71. J. W. Bingham, "Credo", in My Philosophy of Law: Credo of Sixteen
American Scholars 20-21 (1941).
72. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 653.
73. See text at note 65.
74. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra, n. 31 at 408.
75. See, supra, note 32 and accompanying text.

76. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, was equally confused about the facts
of the Dick case. In the text of his opinion, this puzzling statement appears: "The
policy was subsequently assigned to Mr. Dick who was domiciled in Mexico and
'physically present and acting in Mexico' although he remained a nominal resident
of Texas (emphasis added)". Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 638. But doesn't
'permanent residence" mean the same thing as "domicile"? In any event, the
Texas courts' opinions make it perfectly clear that Dick was at all times domiciled
in Texas, and never domiciled in Mexico. Nothing in Justice Brandeis' opinion is
inconsistent with their view which is based on the trial judgment. See Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, Ct. of Civil Appeals decision, supra, n. 32 at 357; Commission of
Appeals decision, supra, n. 32 at 1029-1030.
A few lines later, Justice Brennan wrote: "Dick brought suit in Texas against the
New York reinsurer. Neither the Mexican insurer nor the New York reinsurerhad
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rule. The practice is a carry-over from the time when a contact was
believed to support resort to any domestic rule of the territory in
which it had occurred, on the ground that the legal effect of every
act or event occurring in a given territory must be determined by the
laws prescribed by the government of that territory. State policy (or
interest) analysis requires something more: the act or event that has
occurred must bring the case within the scope of the policy of the
rule invoked.
Justice Powell, with some justification, charged the plurality
opinion of Justice Brennan with this fallacious reasoning. "The
Court," he wrote, "focuses only on physical contacts vel non and in
doing so, pays scant attention the the more fundamental reasons
why our precedents require reasonable, policy-related contacts in
77
choice-of-law cases."
The most singular of these purely physical contacts focused upon
by Justice Brennan was Lavinia Hague's appointment as personal
representative of her husband's estate by a Minnesota Registrar of
Probate. This fact is mentioned at several points in the opinion as an
important relation between her and the state, increasing its concern
for her welfare. 78 Apparently, her husband's NIN driver accident
insurance policy had been made payable not to her, but to her
husband's personal representative or estate. Had it been made
payable to her by name or as his wife, her formal appointment as
personal representative of his estate would have been unnecessary;
she could have sued Allstate in her own name. Granting that
Minnesota had a concern for her maximum recovery because she
any connection to Texas."

But, according to the Texas courts, there were two

reinsurers, the Home Insurance Co. and the Franklin Fire Insurance Co. Both of
these companies carried on business in Texas and had appointed agents for service
as required by Texas law (Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, Ct. of Civil Appeals decision at

357; Commission of Appeals decision at 1029). Each had its head office in New
York (Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, U.S. Supreme Ct. decision, at 402). In footnote 12
of his opinion, Justice Brennan states again: "Dick sought to obtain quasi-in-rem

jurisdiction by garnishing the reinsurance obligation of the New York reinsurer.
The reinsurer had never transacted business in Texas, but it 'was cited by
publication in accordance with a Texas statute; attorneys were appointed for it by
the trial court: and they filed on its behalf an answer which denied liability' "
(Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 638). This quotation from Justice Brandeis'

opinion referred to the original Mexican insurer, not to the New York companies
that had reinsured parts of the risk. Justice Brennan states once more in his footnote
24, referring to the Dick case: "neither insurer nor reinsurer present in forum
State." See also his footnote 1.
77. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 654.

78. "Respondent's

residence and subsequent appointment in Minnesota as
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was a domiciled member of that community, are we to believe that
that concern had been significantly increased by her taking a purely
formal step in order to bring her lawsuit in Minnesota? Of course
not.
Another purely physical contact (perhaps we should call it a part
of a contact) focused on by Justice Brennan may, on first thought,
seem to be less than totally irrelevant. Referring to Mrs. Hague's
change of domicile, he wrote that: "There is no suggestion that
Mrs. Hague moved to Minnesota in anticipation of this litigation or
for the purpose of finding a legal climate especially hospitable to her
claim. The stipulated facts, sparse as they are, negate any such
inference." 7 9 In a footnote, Justice Brennan refers to "the fact that
her change of residence was bona fide and not motivated by
litigation considerations."- 80 These quotations naturally suggest a
most critical question. It has already been demonstrated that where
one party's unilateral, post-accrual change of domicile constitutes
the sole contact with a particular state, it would be quite unfair to the
opposite party to give effect to that state's newly acquired concern
for the moving party. Such unfairness supports a persuasive
argument that no consideration should be given to the law of one
party's post-accrual domicile unless contacts with that state,
favorable to the moving party, already existed. 8 1 Since the law of
the post-accrual domicile is to be excluded from consideration to
prevent unfairness to the nonmoving party, what possible relevance
can be attached to the bona fides of the moving party? Whether his
change of domicile was "motivated by litigation considerations" or
not, application of the law of his new domicile would be equally
unfair to the other party. Why should judges waste time
investigating the knowledge of law and possible motivations of a
party who has seen fit to change his domicile? They are irrelevant to
the issue before the court.
XX. Conclusion
What can the inquiring student of judicial behavior learn from the
Hague case? As is well known, the Supreme Court's tests for the
personal representative of her late husband's estate constitute a Minnesota contact
which gives Minnesota an interest in respondent's recovery.
(Allstate v.
Hague, supra, n. I at 643-644).
79. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 643.
80. Ibid, Justice Brennan's footnote 28.
81. See text at 54-55.
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constitutional correctness of a state court's choice of law are so
permissive that the court has not found it necessary to review a pure
choice-of-law decision since the Clay case of 1959.82 Could Mrs.
Hague have succeeded in avoiding the expense of Supreme Court
review?
In the game of football, 83 there are three techniques for scoring a
point-after-touchdown, of which one is by far the easiest and is,
therefore, usually chosen. Likewise, to avoid Supreme Court
review of a choice-of-law decision, there are two, or possibly three,
techniques, of which one is the most obvious and easy, namely,
obtaining from the state court an opinion which shows convincingly
that the factual contacts of the case (with the state whose domestic
rule has been chosen) fall within the policy reach of that rule. But in
the Hague case, this technique failed because the Minnesota court's
opinion had stressed chiefly Lavinia Hague's post-occurrence
change of domicile, a dangerously unreliable contact, often
resulting in injustice to the nonchanging party. The more reliable
contact of Mr. Hague's long employment in Minnesota received
scant recognition in the Minnesota opinion.
The second technique by which Supreme Court review could
have been avoided has already been discussed at some length in
section III of this paper. It was there concluded that had Mrs. Hague
brought suit in Wisconsin, a court of that state would have held that,
although Wisconsin law did not prohibit all "other insurance"
clauses, those in Hague's policy could not be applied to the facts of
his case. They would have been held to be either totally irrelevant
or, at best, hopelessly ambiguous and, so, properly construed
against the insurer under the contra proferentes rule. Had the
Minnesota court, after stating that it was taking judicial notice of the
Wisconsin law, set forth a clear argument that the other insurance
clauses would be void under Wisconsin law, the Supreme Court
would not have been easily persuaded to review the Minnesota
court's determination of Wisconsin's law. But the Minnesota court
found Wisconsin law to be contrary to that of Minnesota.
The third technique for avoiding Supreme Court review would
have involved a plausible argument, not yet supported by clear

82. See n. 27, supra.
83. This is true for both Canadian and American football.
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precedents. The death of Mr. Hague had occurred on July 1, 1974.
In 1975, the Wisconsin's legislature enacted the following statute:
Other Insurance Provisions (1) General.
When two or more policies promise to indemnify an insured
against the same loss, no "other insurance" provisions of the
policy may reduce the aggregate protection of the insured below
the lesser of, the actual insured loss suffered by the insured, or
the total indemnification promised
by the policies, if there were
84
no "other insurance provision."
At the time that Mrs. Hague's action was begun, on May 28,
1976,85 the law of Wisconsin, as set forth above, appears to have
been identical with that of Minnesota concerning "other insurance"
reduction clauses. 8 6 If this state of affairs had been clearly put
before the Supreme Court of the United States, would they have
granted certiorari on February 19, 1980 to review the Minnesota
court's decision?
The purpose and scope of the Full Faith and Credit clause was
stated by Justice Powell as follows: "The Full Faith and Credit
clause addresses the accommodation of sovereign power among the
various states. Under limited circumstances it requires one state to
give effect to the statutory law of another state . . . .Both the Due
Process and the Full Faith and Credit clauses ensure that the states
do not "reach out beyond the limits imposed upon them by their
status as co-equal sovereigns in a federal system." ' 87 When the
Supreme Court decided to review the Minnesota decision in the
Hague case, some of its members must have thought that
circumstances probably existed under which the clause would
require Minnesota to give effect to the statutory law of Wisconsin.
Assuming such circumstances had existed, at what time would the
clause compel Minnesota to give effect to the Wisconsin law?
Presumably, it would be compelled to do so at the time that the
Minnesota court rendered its final judgment. But, if the Minnesota
judgment, rendered on August 31, 1979, had clearly shown
(quoting the Wisconsin statutes set out above) that the law of the
two states invalidating "reduction clauses" was the same on that
84. Landvatter v. Globe Security Ins. Co. (1980) 200 Wis. 2d 21, 300 N.W. 2d
875 at 24.
85. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 643, n. 27.
86. In the Hague case, the insurance company argued that the "'other insurance"
clause referred to other insurance provided by the same policy. A fortiori, the
statute would have applied to the Hague case.
87. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 651.
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date, would the Supreme Court have thought it necessary to review
the Minnesota decision? Surely not.
What effect will the Hague case have on the legal rights and
liberties of persons who make their home in one state, but have been
employed daily (or working independently) in another on a more
than temporary basis. Such employment was recognized in the
Hague case as creating a status in the state of service, namely, a
membership in the economic community, somewhat resembling
that created by domicile. This status was held to confer rights upon
Hague that did not arise in the course of his work or his daily
commute to his work. They arose from the state's concern that he
should be assisted in providing for his wife after his death. This
concern found expression in the application of a Minnesota law
invalidating "other insurance" reduction clauses in his NIN driver
insurance policy. This concern might, in future cases, be extended
to other kinds of accident or life insurance held by a nonresident
worker or to such a worker's cause of action for personal injuries
suffered outside the state of his service. It might also be extended to
his dependent's cause of action for his wrongful death outside that
state. A single example will suffice to suggest the possibilities for
future development of the rule of the Hague case.
John Dak and his wife Linda had made their home in North
Dakota for many years. They sent their two young children to
school, voted, and paid taxes in that state. But John had been
employed for ten years for a corporation that did business in
Minnesota, packing and selling seed and fertilizer to farmers. It had
its offices and warehouses in East Grand Forks, Minnesota, near the
North Dakota boundary. John and his friend Joe North, who was
also domiciled in North Dakota, decided to go on a hunting trip in
that state. While Joe North was driving his car, with John Dak
riding as a guest passenger, he unexpectedly encountered a broad
stretch of ice on the road. His car went out of control, skidded off
the road, and dropped ten feet over a steep embankment. John Dak
was killed instantly.
Under North Dakota law, a host driver was not liable for the
death of a guest passenger unless it had been caused by his gross
negligence. Hence, Linda Dak brought action against Allstate in
Minnesota (which had no anti-guest statute) for a declaration that
the liability of Joe North for the death of John Dak should be
determined by the laws of Minnesota. Her counsel contended that
the state of Minnesota had a concern for John Dak and his family,
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similar to its concern for Ralph and Lavinia Hague, based on John's
status as a long-time nonresident employee of a Minnesota
enterprise; hence, North's legal responsibilities for Dak's death
should be governed by the Minnesota standard of ordinary care for
the safety of guest passengers. Minnesota's concern for John Dak's
wife in the event of his death, counsel contended, was similar to its
concern for the wife of one of its domiciled citizens. In Schneider v.
Nichols, 8 8 a Minnesota domiciliary had been injured by the ordinary
negligence of a North Dakota host driver in North Dakota. The
Minnesota Supreme Court claimed for that state a governmental
interest in the outcome and applied the Minnesota domestic rule of
ordinary negligence.
Counsel for Allstate would argue, inter alia, that the decision in
the Hague case rested upon three contacts with Minnesota:
(1) Hague's fifteen years of employment there, (2) Allstate's
extensive business there, and (3) Lavinia Hague's change of
domicile to Minnesota before bringing suit in that state. In the Linda
Dak case, the last of these contacts was not present; Linda Dak had
remained domiciled in North Dakota. But, her counsel will
doubtless reply, the judges in the Hague case were bound to
consider all facts favorable to his cause, including her change of
domicile. They expressed no opinion upon what the proper result
would have been had one of the three contacts been lacking. Indeed,
footnote 29 of Justice Brennan's opinion for the plurality in the
Supreme Court stated that "[w]e express no view whether the first
two contacts, either together or separately, would have sufficed to
sustain the choice of Minnesota law made by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota. In short, the newly recognized status based on long
employment in a state seems destined to provoke considerable
discussion affecting ultimate results in future cases." ,89
The various pointed criticisms of judicial choice methodology
suggested in this article should not be allowed to create a misleading
impression concerning the judges' disposal of a cluster of difficult
problems. It will be recalled that satisfaction was expressed
concerning the three major grounds of the plurality opinion. Our
88. (1968) 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W. 2d 254. The opinion in this case is
unfortunately marred by reference to insignificant contacts totally unrelated to the
policy of Minnesota law. See also Foster v. Leggett (Ky. 1972) 484 S.W. 2d 827;
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in Cipolla v. Shaposka (1970) 439 Pa.
563, 267 A. 2d 854.
89. Allstate v. Hague, supra, n. I at 644,
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bases for criticism of some of the reasoning in that opinion were
supported, at least in part, by the dissenting opinion. That opinion
stands firmly in the tradition of valuable dissents, for it challenges
and tests the plurality opinion at every point. Moreover, in attacking
the absurd practice of choosing a state's law in reliance upon factual
contacts quite unrelated to that law or its policies, Justice Powell9 °
strikes at the roots of that rank and deadly noxious weed that
threatens the healthy growth of sound state policy and interest
analysis in the choice-of-law garden. 9 1

90. See epigraph of this paper and text, section XIX.
91. This metaphor is borrowed with respect and admiration from that formidable
weed killer, Walter Wheeler Cook. See Cook, Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laos, Preface, at ix.

